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Abstract
Assortative matching occurs in many social contexts. We experimentally investigate
gender assorting in sub-Saharan villages. In the experiment, co-villagers could form groups
to share winnings in a gamble choice game. The extent to which grouping arrangements
were or could be enforced and, hence, the distribution of interaction costs were exogenously
varied. Thus, we can distinguish between the e¤ects of homophily and interaction costs on
the extent of observed gender assorting. We nd that interaction costs matter  there is
less gender assorting when grouping depends on trust. In part, this is due to trust based on
co-memberships in gender-mixed religions.
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Organisation for Scienti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1 Introduction
Assortative matching the tendency for people to interact with others who are similar to them-
selves more often than with others who are dissimilar has been observed along many di¤erent
dimensions and in many di¤erent networking and group formation contexts. The dimensions
studied include race, religion, age, education, occupation and sex. The types of ties that have
been investigated include acquaintanceship, friendship, co-membership in voluntary organiza-
tions, advice seeking, and support. And the contexts include whole nations, communities, work-
places, and school classes. See for instance the evidence cited in McPherson, Smith-Lovin and
Cook, 2001, Hitsch et al. 2005, Belot and Francesconi 2006, Fisman et al. 2008, Goyal 2007,
and Jackson 2009.
Wherever it is observed and irrespective of the characteristics upon which it is based, as-
sortative matching is a cause for potential concern as it limits peoples social worlds in a way
that has powerful implications for the information they receive, the attitudes they form, and
the interactions they experience(McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook, 2001: p. 415). Despite
these concerns, we know very little about the causes of assortative matching. It could be driven
by homophily, i.e., the desire to interact with similar people, or by opportunity and the corre-
sponding variations in group formation and search costs. It could also result from equilibrium
sorting on certain attributes, as in Beckers (1973) model of the marriage market.
Some evidence supports the idea that opportunity matters. The distribution of a population
across salient types or with respect to salient characteristics is clearly important. However, in
general, this explains only a proportion of observed assortative matching. Zipf (1949) and Gans
(1968) among others present evidence that is consistent with geographical proximity causing
assorting, especially with respect to race, ethnicity, class, education, and occupation. Fischer
(1982) shows that patterns of assortative matching tend to get stronger as more types of rela-
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tionship are shared, i.e., that assortative matching is in some sense cumulative.
Causality is di¢ cult to establish, however. A few longitudinal survey studies (Hallinan &
Smith 1985, Burt 2000 ) and a large number of experimental studies in social psychology (see
Huston & Levinger 1978 for a review) have enabled researchers to distinguish between selection
and socialization e¤ects with the weight of evidence supporting selection when the assorting
relates to attitudes, beliefs, and values. But there is a great deal more to be learnt.
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the factors associated with assortative matching in
the context of group formation. We are interested in understanding the mechanisms that lead
informal groups in African rural communities to self-segregate on the basis of gender. To our
knowledge, assortative matching by gender has not been studied in sub-Saharan Africa. In the
countries where it has been studied, it is not generally as prevalent as assorting based on race,
education, and age (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook, 2001). However, it has been found
to vary markedly according to the context, being weaker within kin groups (Marsden, 1987)
and stronger in more sex segregated environments such as in the workplace and, in the US,
in voluntary organizations (Bielby & Baron 1986, Kalleberg et al 1996, McPherson & Smith-
Lovin 1982, 1986, 1987, Popielarz 1999). Other variations relate to the type of individual being
studied, with assortative matching on gender being stronger in young children (Smith-Lovin and
McPherson 1993, Maccoby 1998), less educated individuals and among African Americans and
Hispanics as compared to Anglo Saxons in the US (Marsden 1987, Blau et al 1991, Verbragge,
1977). Extrapolating from these regularities, one might expect grouping by gender to be common
in rural Africa and other parts of the rural developing world.
This expectation is supported by causal empiricism. Anyone who has convened meetings
in sub-Saharan villages has witnessed men and women dividing into their respective groups
before taking their seats. A similar tendency is reected in the way group-oriented development
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interventions are presented. Women and men are often separated during participatory research
exercises on the grounds that they talk more freely (see, e.g., Chambers, 1994 and Welbourn,
1991). Micro nance similarly tends to be o¤ered to single sexed most often all female 
groups on the grounds that it is empowering (Pitt et al, 2006) and that women are more
responsive to social sanctions (Murdoch, 1999 and Rahman, 1998). Additionally, experimental
work in a Nairobi slum shows men and women in single sex pairs make higher contributions in
a one shot public good game, while sex heterogeneity reduces the contributions of women but
not men (Greig and Bohnet, 2009). Yet, given that some research has shown that assortative
matching has a cumulative e¤ect and given the potential constraints that it places on information
ows, attitudes, and aspirations, it is doubtful that reinforcing emergent assorting on gender is
advisable.
To address this concern, we need to know more about what drives emergent assorting on
gender in the formation of informal groups. To this end, we apply an economic perspective to
an empirical analysis of assorting by gender within the context of a group formation experiment
conducted in 14 Zimbabwean villages. Within the experiment, group formation is benecial as
it allows group members to share risk. This in turn enables them to take on more risk and,
thereby, to secure higher expected rewards. By experimentally altering the institutional context,
the costs associated with forming di¤erent groups are varied exogenously and randomly across
the 14 villages.
In one treatment the grouping and risk sharing agreements are perfectly enforced by us, the
experimenters. The only costs associated with co-grouping relate to the group formation process
and to potential moral hazard, i.e., members of egos group taking more risk than ego would
prefer.1 In a second treatment the grouping and risk sharing agreements are supported only by
1Theory predicts that under these circumstances individuals will choose to group with others who have similar
levels of risk aversion to themselves (Barr and Genicot, 2008). (Barr, Dekker and Fafchamps, 2008) found no
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trust. In this case the costs associated with co-grouping depend on the extent to which others
can be trusted. In a third treatment the grouping and risk sharing agreements can be socially
enforced, i.e., if someone wishes to renege on their group, they have to do so in public and
therefore potentially expose themselves to the wrath of fellow villagers. In this third treatment
the costs of grouping include as before the group formation and moral hazard costs. In addition,
they also depend on the likely impact of the threat of social disapproval and on the value of
pre-existing relationships that may be jeopardized if someone reneges.
Applying dyadic analysis to the experimental data combined with data from surveys and
genealogical mapping exercises, we nd that mixed gender dyads are signicantly less likely to
join the same group than same-sex dyads. This nding is consistent with the aforementioned
studies based outside sub-Saharan Africa and focusing on other types of interaction. However,
when groups are supported only by trust (second treatment) assortative matching by gender
is less prevalent. No signicant di¤erence in assorting by gender is observed between the rst
and third treatments. This suggests that, in the context of our experiment, the extent to which
individuals assort into groups based on gender depends on interaction costs that partly depend
on the nature of the interaction being considered. When trust is essential, we observe less
assortative matching by gender.
To help us interpret this nding, we examine whether the lower gender assorting in the trust
treatment is associated with an increase in the importance of social network ties. Drawing from
the literature on assorting and from our own understanding of the Zimbabwean villages in which
the experiment was conducted, we investigate the possible roles of kinship, religious co-a¢ liation,
and co-memberships in community-based organizations (CBOs). Kinship has been found to be
associated with less assorting on gender in some contexts (Marsden, 1987), and it is likely to be
evidence of this in the dataset used here, but in a similar experiment conducted in Colombia and involving a much
larger sample of individuals this tendency was observed (Attenasio, Barr, Cardenas, Genicot and Megir, 2009).
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associated with higher levels of trust. A¢ liation to the same religious community is associated
with trust in the experimental literature (Fershtman and Gneezy 2001) and, while some religious
congregations are gender specic, most are not. Further, while voluntary organizations in the
US have been found to be highly segregated by gender, this is not always the case in our studied
Zimbabwean villages. In these villages, choirs, dance groups, and football and netball clubs are
highly sex-specic, but organizations serving an economic purpose are not. Using data from
the same experiment, Barr, Dekker, Fafchamps (2008) found kinship, co-religion, and CBO
membership to be associated with an increased likelihood of joining the same group. Here, we
nd that co-religion becomes more salient when grouping depends on trust and that this explains
some but not all of the decline in gender assorting in the trust treatment. So, assorting by gender
is not due to lower interaction costs associated with it being easier to trust members of the same
sex. On the contrary, when trust is important gender assorting diminishes as non-assortative
relations such as religious co-membership come to the fore.
The paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2 we present our conceptual framework and
testing strategy. The data are discussed in Section 3. The empirical results are presented in
Section 4. And, in Section 5, we conclude
2 Empirical strategy
We start by briey summarizing the experimental design and conceptual framework before
presenting our testing strategy.
2.1 Experimental design
The experiment involves a simple gamble choice game. One series of two rounds of this game
was played in each of the 14 villages in the study. The rounds took between one and two hours
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each and were held on consecutive days. The day before the experiment started in each of the
selected villages, each household was visited and invited to send an adult of a specic gender
to be a subject in the experimental series in their village. Whether a man or a woman was
requested was randomly determined, although if none of the specied gender was present, a
member of the other was acceptable. They were told that, preferably, their representative would
be either the household head or their spouse as these are the principle decision makers in the
households.
In the rst round, played the day after the recruitment, each participant was interviewed
privately and asked to select one of six possible gambles g, ranked from the least (1) to the
most risky (6). The gamble choice set was the same for all participants with equally likely high
and low earnings. Riskier gambles had higher expected returns. After selection of the gamble
choice the game was played and realized gains were paid to the participants in private. This
game structure was originally used by Binswanger (1980) to elicit risk preferences: the choice of
gamble implies a range of possible values for the individuals coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.
The gambles used in our experiment are presented in Table 1 together with the implied ranges
of the risk aversion coe¢ cient.2
Once the rst round of gamble choices was complete the participants were invited to return
and play the gamble choice game again the next day. Participants were then given the oppor-
tunity to form sharing groupswith other participants from the same village. They were told
that, within sharing groups, second round winnings would be pooled and shared equally.3
2The gambles are expressed in Zimbabwean $. The o¢ cial exchange rate at the time of the experiment was
around Z$55 for US$1 while the black market rate was around 2.5 times that amount. In the areas where the
experiment was conducted and at the time of the experiments, the daily wage for a farm labourer was around
Z$200. This is similar in magnitude to average experimental winnings of Z$158 in round 1 and Z$172 in round 2.
3The verbal framing of the game was kept to a minimum and, as a consequence, can be likened to a variety
of real life situations, including informal risk sharing, which has been extensively studied in village communities
(e.g., Udry 1994, Ligon, Thomas and Worrall 2001, and Fafchamps and Lund 2003), and group lending with
joint liability (e.g., Karlan 2007, Besley and Coate 1995, Ghatak 1999 and 2000). There is no lending in our
experiment, but participants de facto invest a sure amount (gamble 1) into various risky investments (gambles 2
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The economic literature has proposed three possible mechanisms to explain (positive) assor-
tative matching, i.e., the observation that interacting individuals share many common character-
istics (Belot and Francesconi 2006, Currarini et al, 2007). One possibility is homophily, namely,
that people prefer to interact with people like themselves. A second possibility is opportunity:
people economize on search and group formation costs by joining a group with individuals who
are socially and geographically close. Because proximate individuals tend to share similar char-
acteristics, this shows up as assortative matching. A third possibility arises when people share
common preferences, i.e., they all prefer to interact with individuals with certain characteristics,
and when group size is xed. A canonical example of such a situation is the original marriage
market model proposed by Becker (1973). In this model, all brides and grooms prefer a wealthy
partner but because they can only marry one person and prefer to marry rather than remain
single the stable marriage equilibrium exhibits assortative matching with the wealthiest bride
marrying the wealthiest groom, the second wealthiest bride marrying the second wealthiest
groom, and so on.
In empirical work it is easy to document assortative matching but notoriously di¢ cult to
disentangle the e¤ects of the di¤erent causal mechanisms. However, due to its experimental
nature, our study provides a rare opportunity to do just this. By design, the size of the groups
that individuals can form is restricted only by village size, i.e., by the number of participants;
they can even remain as singletons should they choose. This restricts the likelihood of assorting
emerging due to common preferences. However, if common preferences for grouping with either
women or men are present, ceteris paribus, it would be indicated by more grouping on the part
of the preferred sex. So, if gender assorting in group formation is observed, but after controlling
for other factors women and men are found to be equally engaged in group formation, common
to 6).
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preferences can be ruled out as the causal mechanism.
This would then leave homophily and assorting due to variations in group formation costs
to be distinguished between. To do this we perturb the distribution of the costs of interaction
between pairs of individuals by randomly assigning each village to one of three di¤erent institu-
tional environments. In the rst treatment, equal sharing of winnings among group members is
exogenously enforced by the experimenter: having joined a sharing group, the members cannot
subsequently change their mind. So, regardless of gamble outcomes, winnings are pooled and
shared equally.
In the second treatment, each member of a sharing group can separately and secretly leave
their groups after knowing the outcome of their gamble. In this case, they keep their winnings
but receive no share of the winnings of others in the group. In this treatment, the cost of joining
a group depends on the level of trust.
The third treatment di¤ers from the second in that individuals who leave their group have
to publicly conrm this in front of all other village participants. In this treatment, the cost
of co-grouping depends on the threat of social disapproval and on the fear of the damage that
public defection would cause to existing valuable relationships.
Under each treatment, the consequences of and rules relating to sharing group formation
and defection were explained to the participants at the end of the session on the rst day. The
participants were then given approximately 24 hours to form a group. If they chose to do so
they had to register together on the second day of the game. The second round gamble choices
were made during private interviews and no rules were applied to or recommendations made
concerning gamble choices within groups. Under treatment 2, decisions to leave groups and,
under treatment 3, intentions to leave groups were also made during these meetings. Under
treatment 3, decisions to leave groups had to be conrmed by the leavers revealing themselves
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to all present when invited to do so after all participants had made their decisions in private
interviews. Finally, under all treatments, each participant received their winnings during a
second, brief, private interview just prior to being dismissed.
2.2 Empirical formulation
Building on the work of Barr, Dekker and Fafchamps (2009), our empirical analysis starts with
the estimation of a dyadic model as follows. Let mij = 1 if i joins a risk sharing group with
individual j, and 0 otherwise. The network matrix M  [mij ] is symmetrical since mij = mji
by construction. As noted by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), this implies that the explanatory
variables must enter the model symmetrically. So, the rst model that we estimate is:
mij = 0 + 1jfi   fj j+ 2(fi + fj) + 3dij + 4(tij  dij)
+5jzi   zj j+ 6(zi + zj) + vij + uij (1)
where fi indicates the sex of i, equaling 1 if i is female and zero if i is male, dij is a vector of
the characteristics of the pre-existing relationship between individuals i and j, tij is a vector of
dummy variables indicating which treatment individuals i and j played under, zi is a vector of
other relevant characteristics of individual i including their gamble choice in the rst round, vij
are village xed e¤ects, uij is the error term, and 0 to 6 are the coe¢ cients to be estimated.
A negative and signicant coe¢ cient 1 indicates assortative matching by gender in the
group formation process. A positive (negative) 2 indicates that women engage in more (less)
grouping activity than men and would indicate the presence of a common preference. Coe¢ -
cients 3 and 4 capture the e¤ects of pre-existing network ties and variations in those e¤ects
across treatments.4 Coe¢ cients 5 and 6 capture the e¤ects of a number of other individual
4The interaction e¤ects between pre-existing network ties and the experimental treatments were the focus in
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characteristics that serve as controls.
We then expand the model to include two additional sets of interaction terms:
mij = 0 + 1jfi   fj j+ 2(fi + fj) + 3dij + 4(tij  dij)
+5jzi   zj j+ 6(zi + zj) + 1(tij  jfi   fj j)
+2(tij  (fi + fj)) + vij + uij (2)
A signicant positive (negative) coe¢ cient 1 indicates that assortative matching by gender
is lower (higher) in the corresponding treatment, while coe¢ cient 2 picks up the di¤erential
e¤ects of the treatments on grouping by women and men.
Models (1) and (2) are estimated using a Logit. When estimating these models it is essential
to correct standard errors for non-independence across observations. Non-independence arises in
part because residuals from dyadic observations involving the same individual i are correlated,
negatively or positively, with each other. Standard errors can be corrected for this type of
non-independence by clustering either by dyad, as proposed by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007),
or by village (and, hence, by experimental session). The second approach corrects for possible
non-independence not only within dyadic pairs sharing a common i or j but also across all the
dyads participating in the same experimental session. Because we have data from 14 village
sessions we are able to apply the second, more rigorous approach.5
Barr, Dekker, and Fafchamps (2008). Note that tij does not appear on its own. This is because the treatments were
applied at the village-level and the model includes village xed e¤ects. Because the treatments were randomly
assigned to villages, the inclusion of these xed e¤ects is, in principle, unnecessary. However, the number of
villages under each treatment is small, so, imbalances across villages are a potential concern.
5Nichols and Zeckhauser (2004) argue that when the number of clusters is less than 50, clustering may result in
standard errors that are too large. Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) propose a standard error correction method that
does not require clustering by village. We experimented with this method as well and in general obtain smaller
standard errors. In view of Nichols and Zeckhausers comment, the results presented here should be construed as
conservative in the sense that the e¤ects of interest may be biased towards insignicance.
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3 The data
The experiment was conducted in 23 Zimbabwean villages in 2001. However, in this paper we use
the data from only 14 of these villages. Of the remaining 9, 3 made up a control sample in which
no group formation was allowed and 6 were not fully enumerated during the various surveys and
mapping exercises upon which we draw. Of the 14 villages in our sample, 10 were established in
the early 1980s as result of land redistribution. These resettled villages are relatively small and
geographically concentrated. They have a strong agricultural focus and a stable composition.
Most heads of households and their spouses have resided in the village for at least one decade.
Due to the random selection of settlers, the adult inhabitants of these villages are less likely to be
genetically related to each other compared to members of the non-resettled villages. However,
they engage more in associational activity and have more marriage ties within the villages (see
Barr (2004) and Dekker (2004) for details).
Data on the participantsindividual characteristics, including their sex, age, education, and
their position within the household, were collected at the time of the experiment. Data on
household incomes and holdings of livestock wealth were obtained from the Zimbabwe Rural
Household Dynamics Study (ZRHDS), collected by Bill Kinsey and his team of eld researchers
in 1999 and constructed by Trudy Owens and Hans Hoogeveen. Kinsey et al. (1998), Gunning
et al. (2000) and Hoogeveen and Kinsey (2001) discuss this dataset in detail.
In the analysis we make use of information relating to three types of pre-existing ties. Data on
kinship ties are drawn from specically designed social mapping exercises. These were conducted
in 1999 and 2001 by village focus groups involving one representative from each household
residing in each village (Dekker 2004). The data on memberships in religious congregations and
CBOs are drawn from a 2000 survey by Barr (see Barr 2004 for details). For the purpose of the
analysis presented here, CBOs include only those that have an explicit economic purpose e.g.,
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micro-nance, mutual insurance, funeral societies, irrigation and livestock rearing cooperatives.
Sports clubs, choirs, and dance groups are excluded from the analysis because they were found
by Barr, Dekker, and Fafchamps (2008) not to a¤ect group formation within the experiment,
and also because they are highly sex-segregated.6
4 Summary statistics
Table 2 presents the characteristics of the 382 participants who took part in both rounds of
the experiment in the 14 villages.7 These observations form the basis for our analysis. Just
over half of the participants (52 percent) were women. The average participant is middle-aged
and has slightly more than primary education. Two thirds of the sample are married and are
either a household head or a spouse of a household head. Annual household monetary income
and livestock wealth are approximately log-normally distributed and are incorporated into the
analysis in log form.8 The majority of the participants have a religious a¢ liation most often
with one of the many apostolic churches existing in Zimbabwe. On average, participants belong
to between two and three CBOs with an economic purpose.
Also reported in Table 2 is the proportion of the sample playing under each of the treatments,
the proportion who joined groups, the average gamble choices (where the gamble choice identier
is treated as being cardinal for brevity), and the average winnings per subject in each round of
6We have no information on geographical proximity. However, the villages are small and the majority of the
experimental subjects have lived in the same village for between one and two decades. Gans (1968) and Michaelson
(1976) both found that the importance of geographical proximity as a determinant of tie formation declines over
time.
7Of the participants in the rst round in these villages, 19 did not turn up on the second day, sending a
replacement from the same household in their stead. Because we do not have rst round gamble choice data for
the replacements, they are excluded from the analysis that follows. However, if we do not control for gamble
choice in the group formation regressions and include the replacements, the other ndings remain qualitatively
unchanged.
8To avoid losing observations with no income or livestock wealth, we use log(crop income+1) and log(livestock
wealth+1). Livestock wealth is measured in money terms using local market prices for trained oxen, household
data on numbers of livestock of di¤erent types, and applying the following weights: trained oxen 1.00; cow 0.71;
bull 0.83; young oxen 0.59; calf 0.18; sheep 0.08; goat 0.06; pig 0.06 (Hoogeveen and Kinsey 2001).
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the experiment.9 Treatment 2 is under-represented in the sample. This is the result of having to
drop a number of villages due to incomplete data. However, there remain su¢ cient observations
under each treatment to make meaningful comparisons. Gamble choices in round 1 are included
in the logit regressions to control for attitudes towards risk. Winnings in round 1 are included
to control for income e¤ects and for the possibility that individuals take high winnings in the
rst round as indication that their luck is in and that, as a consequence, they have no need
for insurance in the form of risk sharing. Grouping decisions are the focus of our analysis: just
under half of the participants joined sharing groups in the second round of the experiment and
the average group size is just over 3 members.
Turning to the characteristics of the relationships between participants, we use the kinship
data to construct a variable indicating whether a dyad is related either by blood or marriage.10
When interpreting results relating to this variable, it is important to recall that each household
was invited to send only one representative to the experimental session in their village. So,
husbands and wives are never present together, and people are in the same experiment as their
children or siblings only if they live in separate households. Furthermore, most villages in the
study were made up of stranger households at the time of their resettlement in the early 1980s.
As a consequence the majority of the kinship ties in the dataset are between in-laws. Religious
co-membership is captured by a dummy variable indicating that members i and j of a dyad
belong to the same religious congregation and a count variable is used to capture the number of
CBOs (serving an economic purpose) in which both i and j are members.
Table 3 summarizes the dyadic sample containing each possible pair of participants within
9Descriptive statistics on winning rates support the randomness of the lottery in the experiment: (1) the
overall winning rate was 48% in round 1 and 46% in round 2; (2) winning is independent of gamble choice in both
rounds; and (3) winning is independent between rounds 1 and 2.
10Barr et al. (2008) separated out genetic relatedness and ties due to marriage, using an estimated Hamiltons
ratio to capture the former and a dyadic proximity measure to capture the latter. Here, because we wish to
interact elements of dij with other variables and because genetic relatedness is rare in the dataset, we collapse
the two types of family ties into one.
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each of the 14 villages. Because the average group size is small, only 7 percent of all within-
village dyads are in the same group. Given that the sample is nearly equally divided between
male and female participants, just under half of all dyads are made up of one female and one
male. The average dyad contains just over one female.
Although almost nine out of every ten participants belong to a religious congregation, only
19 percent of the dyads belong to the same church. This reects the diversity of faiths present
in each of the studied villages. The average dyad share membership in just under one CBO.
Table 3 also summarizes the dyadic control variables used in the analysis.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Group formation and gender
Given that the data we are working with comes from a randomized experiment, it is appropriate
to begin with a simple cross-tabulation of the data. As well as revealing the overall level of
gender assorting in the data, this approach has the added advantage of revealing small cell sizes
which can lead to spurious ndings in multivariate analysis.
Cross tabulations are reported in Table 4 in the form of a 44 matrix. The top left-hand cell
relates to the full dyadic sample described in Table 3. All the other cells relate to sub-samples
variably dened. In the top row of the matrix, the full sample, pooled across treatments, is
divided into sub-samples with respect to dyad type: in the second column all female dyads are
considered; in the third all male dyads are considered; and in the fourth mixed gender dyads
are considered. The number of dyadic observations in each cell is listed at the top of the cell.
Mixed gender dyads represent roughly half in each treatment.
The top right-hand cell shows that, across all treatments only 2.1 percent of mixed gender
dyads co-group whereas 14 percent of female dyads and 10 percent of male dyads co-group. The
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di¤erences in co-grouping between mixed gender dyads and both types of same-gender dyad
are statistically signicant and indicate assortative matching by gender: participants in the
experiment are much more likely to form a group with individuals of the same sex. This is
also illustrated by the gender composition of the groups. Of the 47 groups formed during the
experiment, 17 (36 percent) groups are male only, 21 (45 percent) are female only and only 9
(19 percent) are mixed groups. The di¤erence in co-grouping between female dyads and male
dyads, however, is not statistically signicant suggesting that the assorting is not due to common
preferences.
The second, third, and fourth rows of the table split the sample by treatment. In the
rst column of Table 4 we see that, while between 11 and 12 percent of dyads co-grouped
under Treatment 1 (externally enforced contracts), only 9 percent co-grouped under Treatment
2 (enforcement based on trust), and just two percent co-grouped under Treatment 3 (enforcement
based on social sanctioning). These ndings are discussed in detail in Barr and Genicot (2008)
who also explore their theoretical implications.
The fourth column of Table 4 is the most interesting for our purpose. While only two
percent of mixed-gender dyads co-group under Treatment 1, over ve percent co-group under
Treatment 2. The opposite pattern is observed for male and female dyads: in both cases, the
proportion of dyads that co-group is smaller in Treatment 2 than Treatment 1. This suggests
that Treatment 2 a¤ects mixed gender and same gender dyads di¤erently. In Treatment 3 not
even one percent of mixed gender dyads co-group.11 These di¤erences in treatment e¤ects on
same- and mixed-gender dyads are presented graphically in Figure 1. The full height of the
columns in the histogram indicate the proportion of dyads co-grouping under each treatment.
Each column is divided into same-gender (teal green) and mixed-gender (orange) segments.
11Care should be taken when considering further sub-divisions of this cell.
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The Figure shows clearly the overall decline in co-grouping and the simultaneous increase in
mixed-gender grouping as we move from Treatment 1 to Treatment 2.
Table 4 also shows that female dyads are more likely than male dyads to share a family tie
and/or a religious co-membership. They are also more likely to belong to the same CBO. In
contrast, mixed gender dyads resemble the full sample in terms of family ties and religious and
CBO co-memberships. These di¤erences justify moving on to multivariate analysis to safeguard
against confounding e¤ects.
Coe¢ cient estimates for models (1) and (2) are presented columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 re-
spectively. Controls include family ties, religious co-membership, co-memberships in CBOs, and
interaction terms between these network variables and treatments 2 and 3. We see in model (1)
(rst column of the table) that, even with the controls, the mixed gender dyad dummy has a
highly signicant negative coe¢ cient. This conrms the result reported in Table 4 and indicates
that the gender assorting in the experiment is not due to the structure of the networks of family
ties and religious and CBO co-memberships or to imbalances in any other dimension for which
we have data or to any village-level factors. The marginal e¤ect that can be derived from the
estimated coe¢ cient indicates that mixed gender dyads are ve percentage points less likely to
co-group than same-gender dyads.
The second column of Table 5 reports results from model (2) which contains interaction
terms between the mixed gender dyaddummy and indicator variables for Treatments 2 and
3.12 We see that the coe¢ cient on T2 x mixed gender dyadis positive and signicant, while the
coe¢ cient on T3 x mixed gender dyadis not signicantly di¤erent from zero. These ndings
are broadly consistent with those reported in Table 4 and Figure 1. The coe¢ cient on mixed
gender dyaddummy is much larger in model (2) than in model (1); according to model (2),
12Treatment 1 is the basis for comparison.
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under Treatment 1 mixed gender dyads are eight percentage points less likely to co-group than
same-sex dyads, whereas under Treatment 2 they are less than one half of a percentage point less
likely to co-group. This seems to suggest that, under Treatment 2, there is no gender assorting.
However, a linear restriction test indicates that gender assorting remains statistically signicant
under treatment 2.
Table 5 also conrms that the observed gender assorting is unlikely to be due to common
preferences. The coe¢ cient on number of femalesand its interaction with each of the treatment
identiers are insignicantly di¤erent from zero. Unlike the comparison of all female and all male
dyads in Table 4, these insignicant coe¢ cients tell us that irrespective of whether we look at
same or mixed sex dyads, women and men are equally active in group formation under each of
the treatments.
To summarize, gender assorting was observed under all treatments but varied systematically
across treatments and no evidence of a cross-gender di¤erence in grouping activity was observed.
The latter indicates that the assorting is not due to a common preference and, since the main
di¤erence between treatments relates to the mechanisms available to enforce group formation
and, correspondingly, the costs associated with group-formation, these ndings indicate that
gender assorting is not exclusively due to homophily interaction costs matter.
Table 5 also presents the coe¢ cients and standard errors for family ties and religious and
CBO co-memberships and their interactions with treatment dummies. Family ties provide a
basis for co-grouping only under Treatment 3. Religious co-membership provides a basis for co-
grouping in Treatments 2 and 3, but not in Treatment 1. Co-memberships in economic CBOs
provide a basis for co-grouping in Treatments 1 and 2, but according to a linear restriction test
become a signicant reason for not co-grouping in Treatment 3. Barr and Genicot (2008) and
Barr, Dekker, Fafchamps (2008) investigate this nding in detail and attribute it to a fear of
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jeopardizing valuable relationships through spur-of-the-moment defaults.
5.2 Gender assorting and trust
We now investigate why assortative grouping by gender is less pronounced under treatment 2
where grouping depends on trust. The results presented in Table 5 indicate that gender assorting
is not driven by higher trust between individuals of the same gender. Indeed, if this were the
case, we would observe more gender assorting under treatment 2 not less. So, why is there
less gender assorting under treatment 2?
One possible explanation is suggested by observing, in Table 5, that co-religion is more
important in treatment 2, indicating that it provides a basis for trust. If co-religion is associated
with trust and there is no gender assorting into religions, the increased importance of trust
under treatment 2 could cause individuals to seek members of their own religious congregation
to group with and select into more gender-diverse groups as a result.
To establish whether this is the case, we need to do two things. First we need to show
that there is no or very little gender assorting into religious congregations. Second, we need to
establish whether and how much of the reduction in gender assorting between Treatments 1 and
2 is due to the increased importance of co-religion.
Table 4 tackles the rst of these two tasks. There we see that mixed gender dyads are only
slightly (under four percentage points) less likely than same-sex dyads to be members of the
same religious congregation.13
The second task can be performed by augmenting model (2) to include an additional interac-
tion term T2 x mixed gender dyad x Religious co-membership. If the coe¢ cient on the former
is positive and signicant, this means that the increased importance of religious co-membership
13Although small in magnitude, the di¤erence is signicant according to a Chi-squared test corrected for village
clustering, (Chi-square=5.26, p=0.022)
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under Treatment 2 accounts for at least some of the reduction in gender assorting between
treatments 1 and 2. If, in addition, the coe¢ cient on T2 x mixed gender dyad is no longer
statistically signicant once the interaction term is included, we can conclude that the increased
importance of religion in treatment 2 fully explains the decrease in gender assorting.
The results of this exercise are shown in the second column of Table 6. (The rst column
in Table 6 is identical to column 2 in Table 5 and is shown to provide a basis for comparison.)
To avoid spurious inference regarding T2 x mixed gender dyad x Religious co-membership, we
include an interaction term T2 x Number of females in dyad x Religious co-membership to
control for any imbalance across cells. The coe¢ cient on T2 x mixed gender dyad x religious
co-membershipis positive and highly signicant and, according to a linear restriction test, the
sum of the the coe¢ cients on mixed gender dyad, T2 x mixed gender dyadand T2 x mixed
gender dyad x religious co-membershipis statistically insignicant indicating that there is no
gender assorting in group formation among dyads sharing a religious co-membership. Finally,
the coe¢ cient on T2 x mixed gender dyadis still signicant but smaller in magnitude. These
ndings indicate that religious co-membership precludes assortative grouping on gender and that
this explains part of the decline in gender assorting between treatments 1 and 2. However, while
assortative grouping on gender continues to be observed under treatment 2 among dyads that
do not share a religious co-membership this too is diminished in comparison to treatment 1.
To test the robustness of these ndings, in the third column of Table 6 we include four
additional interaction terms. The rst is an interaction between the family tie dummy and T2
x mixed gender dyad. The second is an interaction between co-membership in CBOs and T2 x
mixed gender dyad. These interaction terms allow us to explore the possibility that other types
of network tie are performing a similar role to co-religion under treatment 2 at the same time as
checking that our ndings regarding co-religion are not spurious. We also include the interaction
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terms T2 x Number of females x Familyand T2 x Number of females x Co-memberships in
CBOsto control for any imbalance across cells. Neither of the new interaction terms with the
mixed gender dyad dummy bear signicant coe¢ cients and the estimated coe¢ cients on T2 x
mixed gender dyad x Religious co-membershipand T2 x mixed gender dyadchange very little.
This indicates that our results regarding religion is not driven by family ties or co-membership
in CBOs.
Note the signicant negative coe¢ cient on T2 x Number of females x Family.This suggests
that within family networks women engage in less grouping activity than men under treatment
2. This is interesting as it suggests that, compared to men, women are either less trusting of or
less trustworthy towards their kin, principally their in-laws.
In Appendix 1 we present several additional models that include a number of other interaction
terms of potential interest. These indicate that family ties may be associated with less gender
assorting under Treatment 3. However, given that less than 1 percent of mixed gender dyads
co-group under treatment 3 and given that we nd no di¤erence in gender assorting between
Treatments 1 and 3 in Table 5, we suspect that this nding may be driven by small cell sizes.
6 Conclusion
The study of networks has brought to light the empirical importance of assortative matching in
many social contexts. Three types of causal mechanisms have been highlighted in the growing
literature on the factors that may underlie assortative matching: common preferences combined
with constraints on the number of network ties that can be formed; homophily, i.e., a preference
for interacting with similar others; and opportunity or the costs associated with interacting with
similar others. Here, using an experimentally derived dataset combined with very rich data on
preexisting network ties and individual characteristics, we take some important steps towards
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distinguishing between these three possible causal mechanisms.
Our focus is assortative grouping by gender, a form of assorting that, while only occasionally
observed in OECD-country-based studies, has been casually observed by many in developing
countries and especially sub-Saharan Africa, the region in which our experiment was conducted.
Our data supported these casual observations, indicating that women and men do tend to
segregate when forming interactive groups.
Common preferences were unlikely to be the underlying mechanism leading to the assorting
on gender observed within the experiment because no constraints were placed on group size.
However, they could have generated an observable di¤erence in grouping activity between women
and men. No such di¤erence was observed leading to the tentative conclusion that common
preferences relating to gender are not present, i.e., it is not the case that everyone wishes to
interact with men or that everyone wishes to interact with women.
To identify the possible e¤ects of interaction costs, we made use of the treatment variations
applied during the experiment. Three treatments were applied: in the rst, grouping agreements
were externally enforced by the experimenter; in the second, grouping agreements could be
secretly broken, so grouping depended on trust; and in the third, grouping agreements could be
publicly broken, so grouping could be supported by social sanctions. Each of these treatments
would have generated a di¤erent distribution of interaction costs across dyads. So, if the extent
of gender assorting is found to vary across the treatments it can be taken as evidence that
interaction costs matter.
We found signicant di¤erences in the extent of gender assorting across treatments. In
particular, we observed signicantly less assorting in the second treatment. This leads to the
conclusion that interaction costs are important and, more specically, that gender assorting in
sub-Saharan villages is not driven by relative distrust between men and women.
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In contrast, co-membership in religion was associated with an increased likelihood of co-
grouping under treatment 2. So, in an additional series of analyses we set out to investigate
whether the two ndings were linked. Thus, we established that, (1) there was signicant
but quantitatively minimal gender assorting into religious congregations, (2) among members
of the same religious congregation, there was no gender assorting under treatment 2 in the
experiment, and this explained some but not all of the decline in gender assorting as we moved
to that treatment. In general, men and women not belonging to the same religious congregation
still assorted but also assorted less under treatment 2.
While these ndings shed some light on the relative importance of the possible causal mech-
anisms underlying gender assorting in sub-Saharan villages, they also raise a new set of unan-
swered questions. Specically, what type of network is supporting trust and, thereby, leading
to the decline in gender assorting in treatment 2 even among members of di¤erent religious
congregations? And why does this network not come to the fore when trust does not matter?
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Figure 1: Co-grouping by different dyad types
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Table 1. Gamble choices in Z$ and implied relative risk aversion coefficients
Choice High payoff Prob. Low payoff Prob. EV RA class RA coeff.
1 100 50% 100 50% 100 Extreme infinity to 7.51
2 190 50% 90 50% 140 Severe 7.51 to 1.74
3 240 50% 80 50% 160 Intermediate 1.74 to 0.81
4 300 50% 60 50% 180 Moderate 0.81 to 0.32
5 380 50% 20 50% 200 Slight-neutral 0.32 to 0.00
6 400 50% 0 50% 200 Neutral-negative 0 to -ve infinity
Table 2. Characteristics of participants
Percentage 
or mean Std. Dev.
Subject Characteristics
Female 52.1%
Age 41.971 17.750
Years of schooling 6.762 3.207
Household head 41.9%
Spouse of household head 21.5%
Married 66.5%
Annual household income (1,000sZim$) 2.562 3.374
Ln(Annual household income + 1) 7.185 1.418
Houeshold livestock wealth (1,000sZim$) 11.656 10.124
Ln(Household livestock wealth + 1) 8.195 2.902
Belongs to a religious community 87.7%
Memberships in CBOs 2.30 2.29
Resettled household 75.9%
Experimental variables
Played under treatment 1 41.6%
Played under treatment 2 23.3%
Played under treatment 3 35.1%
Joined a group in round 2 48.7%
Size of group joined (=1 for singletons) 3.168 3.011
Gamble choice in round 1 3.231 1.170
Gamble choice in round 2 3.589 1.130
Winnings in round 1 (Zim$, 2001) 157.13 106.60
Winnings in round 2 (Zim$, 2001) 169.65 121.71
Observations 382
Table 3. Summary statistics for the dyadic sample
Percentage 
or mean Std. Dev.
Dyadic variables of specific interest
Join same group in experiment 7.3%
Female-male dyad 49.3%
Number of females in dyad 1.073 0.708
Family (genetically related or related by marriage) 21.4%
Religious co-membershipgroup 19.3%
Co-memberships in CBOs 0.940 1.134
Control variables: Dyadic differences
Difference in Round 1 gamble choice 1.230 1.066
Difference in Round 1 winnings 116.457 95.794
Difference in age 19.400 14.105
One a household head, one not 44.8%
Difference in years of schooling 3.545 2.720
Difference in ln(annual household income + 1) 1.171 1.301
Difference in household livestock wealth 2.288 3.143
Control variables: Dyadic sums
Sum of Round 1 gamble choices 6.466 1.621
Sum of Round 1 winnings 323.597 150.778
Sum of ages 84.029 24.842
Number of household heads in dyad 1.289 0.685
Sum of years of schooling 13.819 4.527
Sum of ln(annual houehold incomes + 1) 14.477 2.147
Sum of household livestock wealth 16.601 4.085
Observations 10470
Table 4. Dyadic Cross-tabulations
All dyads  Female dyads  Male dyads  Female-male dyads   
All treatments N= 10470  N= 3032  N= 2272  N= 5166
mean non zero  mean non zero  mean non zero  mean non zero
Female-male dyads 0.493 49.3%
Join same group in exp. 0.073 7.3%  0.139 13.9%  0.102 10.2%  0.021 2.1%
Family 0.214 21.4%  0.270 27.0%  0.165 16.5%  0.203 20.3%
Religious co-membership 0.193 19.3%  0.229 22.9%  0.176 17.6%  0.180 18.0%
Co-mememberships in CBOs 0.940 57.8%  1.431 73.4%  0.653 43.3%  0.779 55.0%   
Treatment 1 N= 4532  N= 1486  N= 840  N= 2206
mean non zero  mean non zero  mean non zero  mean non zero
Female-male dyads 0.487 48.7%
Join same group in exp. 0.115 11.5%  0.214 21.4%  0.188 18.8%  0.020 2.0%
Family 0.196 19.6%  0.234 23.4%  0.181 18.1%  0.177 17.7%
Religious co-membership 0.186 18.6%  0.209 20.9%  0.171 17.1%  0.176 17.6%
Co-mememberships in CBOs 0.980 58.6%  1.584 76.6%  0.564 41.7%  0.732 52.9%   
Treatment 2 N= 1698  N= 354  N= 488  N= 856
mean non zero  mean non zero  mean non zero  mean non zero
Female-male dyads 0.504 50.4%
Join same group in exp. 0.088 8.8%  0.164 16.4%  0.094 9.4%  0.054 5.4%
Family 0.221 22.1%  0.316 31.6%  0.148 14.8%  0.224 22.4%
Religious co-membership 0.199 19.9%  0.333 33.3%  0.131 13.1%  0.182 18.2%
Co-mememberships in CBOs 0.718 51.9%  1.085 74.6%  0.479 34.0%  0.703 52.8%   
Treatment 3 N= 4240  N= 1192  N= 944  N= 2104
mean non zero  mean non zero  mean non zero  mean non zero
Female-male dyads 0.496 49.6%
Join same group in exp. 0.021 2.1%  0.037 3.7%  0.030 3.0%  0.009 0.9%
Family 0.230 23.0%  0.302 30.2%  0.159 15.9%  0.221 22.1%
Religious co-membership 0.199 19.9%  0.223 22.3%  0.203 20.3%  0.183 18.3%
Co-mememberships in CBOs 0.986 59.2%  1.342 69.1%  0.822 49.6%  0.858 58.0%
Notes: 'Female-male dyads', 'Join same group', Same religious group', and 'Family' are all dichotomous (0,1) variables, so their 
means and percentages of non-zeros are equivalent; 'Comemberships. in CBOs' is a count variable, so the means and percentages 
of non-zeros are not identical.
Table 5. Dyadic analysis of treatment responses by different dyad types
(1)  (2)
Female-male dyad -1.954 *** -2.530 ***
(0.424) (0.503)
T2 x Female-male dyad 1.525 **
(0.639)
T3 x Female-male dyad -0.033
(0.380)
Family (blood or marriage) -0.096 -0.120
(0.328) (0.335)
Religious co-membership 0.061 0.072
(0.074) (0.093)
Co-mememberships in CBOs 0.134 ** 0.112 *
(0.060) (0.060)
T2 x Family -0.396 -0.348
(0.337) (0.330)
T2 x Religious co-membership 0.332 ** 0.408 **
(0.167) (0.204)
T2 x Co-mememberships in CBOs 0.162 0.151
(0.177) (0.159)
T3 x Family 1.104 1.111 *
(0.668) (0.638)
T3 x Religious co-membership 1.038 *** 1.015 ***
(0.226) (0.243)
T3 x Co-mememberships in CBOs -0.345 *** -0.301 **
(0.133) (0.120)
Number of females in dyad 0.019 0.027
(0.145) (0.172)
T2 x Number of females in dyad 1.013
(0.715)
T3 x Number of females in dyad -0.066
(0.438)
Other controls (*):  included but not shown
Pseudo R-squared 0.226 0.233
(*) absolute differences in and sums of age, household headship dummies, years of schooling, log 
household income, log livestock wealth, 1st round gamble choices, and 1st round winnings;
Notes: Estimated Logit coefficients presented; corresponding standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted to 
account for non-independence within villages/sessions by clustering; n=10470 throughout; *** - significant 
at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Table 6. Dyadic analysis of orgins of different treatment responses by different dyad types
(1)  (2)  (3)
Female-male dyad -2.530 *** -2.530 *** -2.531 ***
(0.503) (0.504) (0.504)
T2 x Female-male dyad 1.525 ** 1.399 ** 1.391 **
(0.639) (0.662) (0.685)
T3 x Female-male dyad -0.033 -0.056 -0.020
(0.380) (0.399) (0.322)
T2 x Female-male dyad x Belong to same religious grp 0.741 *** 0.767 ***
(0.146) (0.113)
T2 x Female-male dyad x Family 0.059
(0.486)
T2 x Female-male dyad  x Co-mememberships in CBOs -0.036
(0.140)
Family (blood or marriage) -0.120 -0.120 -0.120
(0.335) (0.335) (0.334)
Religious co-membership 0.072 0.072 0.075
(0.093) (0.093) (0.094)
Co-mememberships in CBOs 0.112 * 0.112 * 0.113 *
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
T2 x Family -0.348 -0.366 0.650
(0.330) (0.334) (0.432)
T2 x Religious co-membership 0.408 ** -0.264 -0.239
(0.204) (0.480) (0.376)
T2 x Co-mememberships in CBOs 0.151 0.166 0.015
(0.159) (0.150) (0.185)
T3 x Family 1.111 * 1.110 * 1.113 *
(0.638) (0.638) (0.638)
T3 x Religious co-membership 1.015 *** 1.015 *** 1.013 ***
(0.243) (0.243) (0.243)
T3 x Co-mememberships in CBOs -0.301 ** -0.301 ** -0.304 **
(0.120) (0.120) (0.122)
Number of females in dyad 0.027 0.027 0.026
(0.172) (0.172) (0.173)
T2 x Number of females in dyad 1.013 1.013 1.015
(0.715) (0.715) (0.716)
T3 x Number of females in dyad -0.066 -0.066 -0.064
(0.438) (0.438) (0.440)
T2 x Number of females x Religious co-membership 0.301 0.242
(0.270) (0.174)
T2 x Number of females x Family -1.014 ***
(0.221)
T2 x Number of females  x Comememberships in CBOs 0.216
(0.158)
Other controls (*):  included but not shown
Pseudo R-squared 0.233 0.234 0.236
Notes: Estimated Logit coefficients presented; corresponding standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted to account for non-
independence within villages/sessions by clustering; n=10470 throughout; *** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * 
significant at 10%. 
(*) absolute differences in and sums of age, household headship dummies, years of schooling, log household income, log 
livestock wealth, 1st round gamble choices, and 1st round winnings;
Appendix Table 1. Adding other interaction terms to the dyadic analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female-male dyad -2.624 *** -2.510 *** -2.317 *** -2.530 *** -2.530 *** -2.530 ***
(0.505) (0.517) (0.514) (0.504) (0.504) (0.503)
T2 x Female-male dyad 1.491 ** 1.538 ** 1.593 ** 1.524 ** 1.525 ** 1.524 **
(0.686) (0.639) (0.636) (0.639) (0.639) (0.639)
T3 x Female-male dyad -0.019 -0.039 -0.034 -0.032 -0.035 -0.033
(0.368) (0.387) (0.376) (0.380) (0.380) (0.381)
Female-male dyad x Family 0.459
(0.424)
Female-male dyad x Religious co-membership -0.089
(0.332)
Female-male dyad x Co-mememberships in CBOs -0.248
(0.306)
T3 x Female-male dyad x Family 1.219 ***
(0.411)
T3 x Female-male dyad x Religious co-membership 0.017
(0.198)
T3 x Female-male dyad x Co-mememberships in CBOs -0.890
(0.731)
Family (blood or marriage) -0.074 -0.113 -0.103 -0.120 -0.121 -0.119
(0.312) (0.336) (0.322) (0.335) (0.335) (0.335)
Belong to same religious group 0.072 -0.075 0.078 0.071 0.077 0.072
(0.092) (0.211) (0.089) (0.094) (0.094) (0.093)
Co-mememberships in CBOs 0.111 * 0.110 * 0.006 0.112 * 0.112 * 0.112 *
(0.060) (0.060) (0.160) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
T2 x Family -0.474 -0.357 -0.389 -0.347 -0.348 -0.348
(0.371) (0.332) (0.317) (0.331) (0.330) (0.330)
T2 x Religious co-membership 0.413 * 0.424 * 0.350 * 0.408 ** 0.402 * 0.408 **
(0.222) (0.229) (0.189) (0.204) (0.206) (0.205)
T2 x Co-mememberships in CBOs 0.158 0.148 0.279 0.150 0.151 0.150
(0.154) (0.160) (0.238) (0.159) (0.159) (0.159)
T3 x Family 1.052 1.097 * 1.088 * 0.205 1.130 * 1.128 *
(0.694) (0.643) (0.628) (0.709) (0.637) (0.610)
T3 x Religious co-membership 1.013 *** 1.043 *** 1.011 *** 1.000 *** 1.239 *** 1.023 ***
(0.241) (0.239) (0.244) (0.226) (0.382) (0.253)
T3 x Co-mememberships in CBOs -0.296 ** -0.299 ** -0.261 -0.308 ** -0.302 ** -0.082
(0.120) (0.120) (0.137) (0.121) (0.122) (0.444)
Number of females 0.041 0.008 -0.034 0.028 0.027 0.027
(0.174) (0.173) (0.197) (0.172) (0.172) (0.172)
T2 x Number of females in dyad 0.881 1.029 0.964 0.455 1.011 1.478 **
(0.723) (0.707) (0.687) (0.683) (0.744) (0.631)
T3 x Number of females in dyad -0.045 -0.090 -0.060 -0.215 0.020 0.001
(0.438) (0.445) (0.437) (0.374) (0.463) (0.392)
Number of females x Family -0.074
(0.215)
Number of females x Religious co-membership 0.118
(0.160)
Number of females x Comememberships in CBOs 0.065
(0.080)
T3 x Number of females x Family 0.507 *
(0.288)
T3 x Number of females x Religious co-membership -0.218
(0.183)
T3 x Number of females x Comememberships in CBOs -0.100
(0.305)
Other controls (*):  included but not shown
Pseudo R-squared 0.234 0.234 0.235 0.235 0.234 0.234
(*) absolute differences in and sums of age, household headship dummies, years of schooling, log household income, 
log livestock wealth, 1st round gamble choices, and 1st round winnings;
Notes: Estimated Logit coefficients presented; corresponding standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted to account for 
non-independence within villages/sessions by clustering; n=10470 throughout; *** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 
5%; * significant at 10%. 
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